

The Creation of Individual and Collective Strategies of Survival as a Pre-Condition for Capitalist Development. The South Korean Example¹ *

Paper presented at the Fifth International Conference on Korean Studies, Osaka, Japan, Aug. 8, 1997

by Holger Heide, Professor of Economics, University of Bremen

I. Introduction: The „secret“ of development

Capitalist development and the integration into the world market of South Korea has lasted 35 years until now. In this short period of time people in South Korea have experienced a social change, for which the old industrialized nations needed 150 or even 250 years. We know from English history, that it took many decades to „make“ (E.P. Thompson) out of the former peasants gradually a working class, who finally had given up their old values and living habits and had become prepared to take up work in „their“ factory.

Capitalist development is essentially bound to capital. It is important to point out, that capital is not in the first place an amount of money. Money is capital through its chance of valorization, which depends on the command over labor. Thus in the last instance all depends on the opportunity to exploit human beings as labor force.

In this sense the decisive question with a social economic approach is: how does capitalist development depend on people's acting.

Precondition for the functioning of a system, in which not every single action is planned and controlled, is, that the acting people have internalized the system's rationality of action.

Systems that are mainly based on personal subjection require the internalization of life world rationality of action, to be acquired in the process of socialization. On the other hand a system based on unpersonal power requires the internalization of „systemic“ rationality of action, i. e. of capital.

¹ I am indebted for valuable remarks regarding an earlier draft of this paper to the participants in my seminar on theoretical and methodological aspects of social economic research at the University of Bremen.

From the now old industrial countries, we know, how these processes of internalization have historically proceeded. On the contrary many examples from industrially underdeveloped countries show, that people are not prepared to internalize the rationality of capital, that capitalism remains something external for them. That means that they are surely obliged to accept it as a frame condition, but never the less oppose the restrictive penetration into their feeling and thinking.

And then we have the examples from the „Tiger“ states, especially from South Korea, where people have internalized capitalist rationality very quickly. How can it be explained, that this process in South Korea has preceded so overwhelmingly fast? This question is subject of a long lasting debate, which has been booming during the last years - not only in connection with the admission of South Korea into the OECD, but especially for the reason, that South Korea was taken as an example for the so-called Transition Economies (see Lee, 1995).

To make it clear before hand: „Explanations“ that are bound on favorable world market conditions or other exogenous „factors“ really don't explain anything. Because the question whether products are marketable on the world market arises only, after they have been produced. Indeed the question to be answered is, how could it happened so suddenly that people, until then only accustomed to peasants' work, became prepared to produce industrially for an abstract world market?

Just as little do those endogenous explanations save either, which refer the so-called „Confucian values“, having allegedly destined Korea for capitalist development. This thesis is very popular especially in the West because it is so simple and because it is useful as an argument against the allegedly „excessive demands“, as an ideological weapon for both the neo-liberal and the conservative „revolution“ in the age of globalization.

In reality there is little to be characterized as a continuity of Confucian thinking in South Korea. Mental development is rather characterized by discontinuities than by continuities. Confucianism - at least in its Korean tradition, originally imported from China - was neither favorable for making money nor for the military dictatorship, through which the capitalist system was finally enforced successfully. Additionally Confucianism was seen by the younger people as something conservative and in its Japanese form belonged rather to the repudiated values, that were to be overcome

Other explanations focus the allegedly successful mixture of market and state and others even try to see the colonial heritage as a promoting factor for development.

The Park regime, under which the industrialization began, on the other hand can not merely be interpreted as a regime of oppression that would have squeezed out of the people degrading performances. Obviously Park was successful in obtaining substantial support at least temporarily. There were e.g. held elections, in which a majority voted for the dictator. On the other hand oppression does not automatically lead to successful capitalist development (Heide 1997 b, p. 7). In the world of today there are numerous examples for terroristic regimes in developing countries, if we talk about Cambodia or Myanmar in Asia, about Ruanda and others in Africa, about many regimes in Latin America etc. The „successes“ regarding developmental goals are almost negligible. A vivid example for this is – as I will argue – also the situation after the Korean war in the second half of the 1950's.

Surely the ideological offensive of the Park regime was of great importance for legitimizing the system (cf. Lee, E. J.. 1995). What is not explained by this however is, how this offensive could fall on fertile ground at all. Especially there can be no doubt, that economic success itself fulfills a legitimatory function. But this presupposes an orientation of the people by the criterion „economic development“, i.e. an identification with capitalist rule in general². If we look at the change that had taken place between 1945 and the mid-60's, it becomes quite obvious, that the mentioned essential prerequisite must have emerged during that period of time. It's my opinion therefore, that the question of the legitimization of the Park regime requires an analysis of both, the periods 1945-53 and 1953-61.

In trying this I do not want to introduce a new mono-causal, nor a „multifactor“ model of explanation. My intention is to provide with my hypothesis a hint to a possible answer to a question open until now.

At first, we need an explanation of the lasting destruction of the paradigms standing in the way of capitalist development. The old late-feudal conditions in the villages, sure, were not favorable for capitalist development, and the new progressive thinking, on the other hand, that had developed during the era of colonialism and had bursted out after the defeat of Japan in the Pacific War, not either. Obviously these ideas must have been exterminated together with their protagonists in the following period of counter guerilla and civil war.

In former contributions I have used terms like „ideological vacuum“ (cf. Heide 1997b) and „political and moral defeat of the progressive forces“ (Heide 1993) in

² Moreover the individual economic situation for the majority was not really improved during the 60's. Especially the turn from the concept of import substitution to that of export promoting industrialization was possible only on the basis of extremely low wages and smultaneously the ruining of peasant agriculture.

order to characterize the initial position for Parks offensive. In this paper I will try to put this argument somewhat more precise.

My main thesis:

My thesis is that the period of fighting all progressive ideas and those not in agreement with US-American ideas as well as their supporters climaxing in terror and physical annihilation, which experienced its peak during the Korean War, has caused a trauma resulting in a kind of collective „identification with the aggressor“. The traumatic identification implies an extermination of the consciousness about the own history and the punishment of the repressed parts of the self which takes the form of the anti-communist hysteria (the so called „Red Complex“).

Methodological note:

Let me put in a short methodological note here: In my argument I will move in different dimensions, namely the individual and the collective (societal) one. Moreover it may seem, that I try to apply an interdisciplinary approach, bringing together political-economical and psycho-analytical and addiction-theoretical arguments. This is an expression for the fragmentation of science, hence of modern society, which impedes an holistic approach. A special emphasis I want to lay on the fact, that my application of findings regarding the psyche of the individual, on collective processes is not meant as an extrapolation nor as an analogy. The point is, what is more, that society is really discoverable in the individual³.

II. Overview over the stages of post-liberation development

1. Resistance and liberation

Korean nationalism has a long anti-feudal / anti-foreign tradition. During the time of colonialism through Japan in the first half of this century resistance became identical with anti-Japanism, a strong Korean nationalism developed little by little with drastic demands for radical social changes of the old, late feudal social structures hindering any progress.

³ cf. the term „holographic principle“, with which Anne Wilson Schaef tries to describe the relationship between society and the individual (Schaef/Fassel 1988)..

For the development of a progressive resistance movement the bitter experiences of oppression on the one hand and the circulation of revolutionary ideas among the youth, who were torn away from the old village community especially through the war on the other, played an important role,

The will for liberation, that had developed and accumulated for decades, bursted out with the impending defeat of Japan in the Pacific War in the summer of 1945. In many villages and cities liberation committees were organized that took over the real power and administration after the withdrawal of the Japanese army and police. A provisional National Assembly was prepared in Seoul.

The basic popular demands included the expropriation of the big landowners and the distribution of the land to the peasants. On this basis the National peasants association was founded. The workers, still a very small minority in society, founded a National association of trade unions, too.

2. The lost revolution

With the invasion of the US army in Seoul on September, 8, 1945 the extermination of this progressive movement began. The prevention of the National Assembly and the appointment of an American military government, the elimination of local self-administration and finally the ban of the trade union- and peasants associations initiated a phase in which the resistance step by step developed into a guerrilla movement. Until the beginning of the Korean War the anti-guerrilla warfare had already killed 200 000 people.

In the Korean War that dragged on until 1953 and changed wide parts of the country into a crater landscape through various captures and re-captures under the deployment of napalm blanket-bombs of the US airforce, millions of people lost their lives and homes, and this finally sealed the division of the county near the border where the war had started. It was this experience that led to the extermination of the idea of an alternative to the capitalist system.

3. Stagnation and decay

Though the preconditions for a capitalist development were extremely bad, because on the basis of resignation and hopelessness a societal dynamic cannot emerge. And, indeed, the country sank into poverty and stagnation for the rest of the decade. The

South Korean regime under the aged dictator Rhee Syngman based on the very beginnings of the State-Chaebol-Complex, a corrupt nepotism of state administration and „bureaucracy capital“. From that a deep economic depression and election forgery followed and led to bloody revolts especially from students and finally to the resignation of Rhee and to a democratic interlude.

The unfulfilled basic needs of the masses forced its way; but in view of South Korea's dependence on the USA and the hindering corrupt interests of a ruling elite a realization of the needs was not to think of, especially because of the disorientation and the lack of any definite line of the weak democratic forces. There was no idea of an alternative, that could move the masses. The resulting essentially populist policy almost immediately led to a complete ruin of public finance, and the country practically sank into chaos.

4. Development dictatorship

That was the basis the armed forces found under Park Chung-Hee when they established a „development dictatorship“ with their coup in 1960. Park quickly recognized that he could have important partners in the new industrialists that were in a way „fed up“ in the years before, to accomplish his development plans. By including these into the new dynamic development policy the former „bureaucratic capital“ became one that depended on the economic interests of the government and at the same time was supported by the new ruling class (compare Lee 1993, p. 80). There is far-reaching agreement in literature about the observation, that the coup was felt as a „release“, in general.

The pillars of the Park's development policy were:

- the establishment of an efficient state bureaucracy and a tight central planning apparatus;
- the systematic preference of big combines (Chaebol) regarding the allocation of the big development plans.
- the dynamic extension of the education system from bottom up with the goal of (a) ideological and (b) professional qualities;
- the systematic planning (5 year plans) to establish an efficient economic structure from bottom up (basic infrastructure - light industry - heavy industry - high technology).

5. The South Korean planning system

The planning system that has efficiently functioned for three decades, is the center of the State-Chaebol-Complex. In a recent analysis of the OECD this is characterized as planning within a „quasi-internal organization“ (Lee,1966).

Essential for the outstanding efficiency of the Korean central planning was that the government resisted the temptation to control the whole economic process in a bureaucratic way. The tight prescriptive planning was concentrated on few strategic sectors and companies. By this the left areas were not only simply discriminated, on the other hand they were also free to look for supplier- and sales connections. This prevented the discriminated sectors from being demotivated, a problem often observed in socialist countries. On the contrary, they were motivated to develop an increasingly higher productivity and to contribute to the enforcement of low wages by the opened up possibility of passing-on the pressure of the market.

III. The Concept of „The Identification with the Aggressor“

1. The original psychoanalytical concept

According to Mathias Hirsch severe traumatic aggression through political persecution, torture, and concentration -camp terror in the same way as severe violence against defenseless children in the family can be psychically coped with the identificatory acceptance of and submission to the overwhelming power.

With this remarks Hirsch refers to the concept „Identification with the Aggressor“, introduced by Ferenczi into the psychoanalytical Theory (Ferenczi 1933). Originally this concept was developed in order to explain the often made observation, that children as victims of sexual abuse, physical mistreatment or psychological terror by their parents introject this terror, identify themselves with the aggressor. The power of the aggressing person is so overwhelming in this case that a rebellion or even an avoidance is not to think of: „The children feel, psychically and morally helpless, their personality is still consolidated to little to be able to protest even in their thoughts (Ferenczi, 1933, p. 308).

In this situation appearing lethal, the identification with the aggressor is a strategy of survival: „If I submit myself to his will to such an extent, that I cease to exist, hence I don't resist, he will possibly spare me alive“ (Ferenczi 1985, p. 155).

What in a concrete single situation helps to secure survival, as a strategy against continued aggression by repetition becomes a pattern of behavior („repetition compulsion“ in Freud), through which the concerned person makes himself a lifelong victim by ego-destruction. This pattern impedes real vividness by fading-out systematically all alternatives.

This latter result is identical with the results of modern addiction research about fixed patterns of action as the core of the addictive processes.

In trying to make the concept „Identification with the Aggressor“ even more precise Hirsch includes the results of Anna Freud. Hirsch differentiates between the just drafted form of the introjective identification, which he calls „primary Coping identification“, and a „secondary, ego-differentiating identification“. This secondary identification makes a later culprit out of the victim. He directs the once suffered violence against „underdogs“ (Hirsch 1996, p. 203).

A. Freud had described this kind of „identification with the Aggressor“ for the less essentially threatened cases of aggression (partly also only expected aggressions) of adults.

In both kinds of identification a dissociation from the self - or better: a „betrayal of the self“ (Arno Gruen 1986) takes place. The interjection of an alien identity means, that the concerned person takes the alien wants for the own wants. However the permanent suppression of the fear for the stirring of the self binds a lot of energy and results in somatic symptoms. i. e. as muscle tension, paratonia (Lowen, 1980).

2. Identification with the aggressor and the loss of spirituality

When we consider the „vital necessity“ from the victims point of view of maintaining the relationship to the (violent) adult, this does not only - finally not even mainly apply to a physical sense, it concerns the fear for the loss of the connection with the „greater whole“, with vital energy at all. Because this connection is only mediated by the concerned adults, there is still no independent connection (cf. Ferenczi's formulation, cited above).

We get to know ourselves as part of the greater whole through the love of the parenting persons. If these „implicitly withdraw“ (Hirsch) this connection through their violence, then our spiritual existence is threatened directly. The fear for this is probably even stronger than the fear of death in the physical sense. In order not to

cut off the connection to the aggressive person in the situation of fear the victim decides for the physical survival and it is this decision, which in the long run binds it to the aggressor.

IV. Identification with the aggressor as a process of destruction of societal identity

1. The identification with the aggressor in the first generation

What remains after the traumatic defeat is the fear for the fear for weakness and therewith the necessity of its repression. With that the own feeling, thinking and action have to be repressed as well as they have been the reason for the defeat.

What can individual psychologically be called the separation the self and - as I have mentioned above - is identical with the loss of spirituality, that corresponds societally to the separation (or alienation) from their own history; or - as Marx formulates - : The individuals have alienated themselves from their own social relation. When the belief in any alternative is destroyed, the individuals develop a „private interest, which can only be achieved within the conditions set by the society; hence are bound to the reproduction of these conditions“ (Marx 1939, p. 74). If people cut off from the true tradition, they clutch at pseudo-traditions (nostalgia). These forms are taken as a compensation of the „cold rationality of capital“⁴, whereas the latter is taken an „reality“ (cf. Hartmann, 1988).

After 1953 there was nothing apart from anti-Communism with which an identification would have been possible. Out of this a frustration about the real weakness of the aggressor finally becoming evident (cf. Henderson 1968, p. 175 f.) can have developed, because of that feeling the own defeat was even harder to cope with. That was a deeper reason for lethargy, resignation, passivity, which didn't offer a ground for any development at all.

In this situation Park Chung-Hee with his „vision“ came just right (cf. Lee, E. J., 1995). His coup was felt as a „release“, as a release from paralysis.

From now on a society was built on aggressiveness. The most important form of expression were militarism (industrial workers were called „soldiers of production“)

⁴ They function as quasi-addictive drugs: As they do not permit a real satisfaction, you need increasing quantities of it.

and boundless competition. The term „No. 1“ became not only the leitmotiv for the economic development strategy, but also for the pitiless struggle each against each other. While the official propaganda said: „We have to become No. 1 in the economic struggle against the rest of world“, the hidden message was:“Everyone has to stand the test in the struggle of competition!“ The allegedly East-Asian peculiarity of the importance of the family, so often pointed out in the West, is only a marginal modification, being based on the fact that the family as a resource in the capitalist development process had not yet been used up, and only in the course of the last two decades has reached its limits of exploitation.

The embeddedness and with that the welltaken care-of in the family corresponds on the other hand to an immense pressure of expectation on the individual, to assert himself in the competition for which the family makes him fit.

This aggressiveness is no longer an expression of the primary immediate introjective identification, but of the secondary, ego-differentiating identification. Collectively (societally) this appears as a contempt and aggressiveness against the (weaker) minority of those who are associated with that feeling, thinking and acting that was experienced as the reason for the defeat. The auto-aggression which appears as the self-sacrifice for the system is accompanied by a contempt against the underdogs of the society. Part of this is the wide-spread, partly open, partly covered aggression against children, the elderly, the handicapped, immigrant workers etc.

The dissociation from the self leads to a hatred against those parts of the self that once were there and now have to be repressed. From the societal point of view this means, that „communists“, „spies“ etc. are persecuted and hated - because they are a permanent reminder of the repressed self.

2. The tradition of the essentially secondary identification to the next generation

The direct primary experience of the overwhelming violence during the years 1945-53, with extreme effect on practically every individual between 1950-53, can surely explain the reaction of the great majority of the then active generation. But even if we take the lifelong consequence of the described introjection for granted, it would at last be a temporary effect as well, dying out with the actual generation. So I have to give an additional explanation for the lastingness of the impact I claim. It is my opinion, that when the societal process has first been initiated, it tends to perpetuate itself independently. The second step concerns the handing-down. With this I mean less the subjectively conscious and wanted process of tradition of certain values from one generation to the next one, but I mean the observable objective persistence of

basic attitudes towards societal and ethical values and maxims of acting. In these terms I include the direct as well as the indirect consequences of socialization, the wanted consequences as well as those which in the real societal process develop behind the back of the acting people (Heide, 1995, p. 162).

What I have mentioned until now concerns the first generation. Indeed: Those who literally kill themselves with work fortunately belong to the past. The Chon-Taeil-generation doesn't exist any more, even though within the workers movement it is still hold up. In the meantime a modern working class has emerged, that fights for higher wages and a social network, organized in strong unions.

As I mentioned before, social action can not be isolated from peoples feeling and thinking, from their attitudes towards ethic values. And these values can be interpreted as an expression of their spirituality. It is a question of spirituality, how we treat other humans and how we treat our social and natural environment in general. If we assume a considerable loss of spirituality in the first generation, what can than be the consequences for the next generation? This question concerns the primary socialization. I want to make only some short remarks regarding the problems in this context (for detail cf. Gruen 1986).

The decisive condition for the development of empathy is an intimate physical-emotional relationship with parenting persons, who themselves are able to devote themselves with unconditional love to the small child. As soon as the direct prenatal connection with the mother is cut, the relation of the baby with his fellow-humans becomes a problem of communication. From then on all depends on the ability of the adults to understand the signals, with which the baby expresses its needs. To learn to know these signals is not a cognitive problem; decisive is the emotional ability. This is the emotional ability of the adults to listen to the unscrupulousness, with which the child expresses his needs. Precisely at this point the unconscious defensiveness of the adults can become a problem for the child.

Such a defensiveness can in most cases be interpreted with disturbances in the emotional development of the adults themselves. Often the fear to become confronted with their own carefully repressed feelings may only allow defensiveness.⁵ In every day life the problem takes many shapes. It starts with the fact, that the fathers are away from the family up to 14 or 16 hours a day (cf. Kim, E.Y. 1997), that they come home completely burnt-out, that the mothers, often having two duties - outside and inside the family - are overstrained. So the consequence

⁵ This phenomenon is observable millions of times as a problem of „Adult Children from Alcoholic and other additives families“, who suffer essentially of the same disorders as their parents and therefore are themselves extremely endangered for addiction.

tends to be, that the parents hope to prepare their children for a better life than they themselves have experienced, in preparing them optimally for the process of competition, i.e. to impart to them staying power, toughness and professional skill. This transmission works mostly through a message like this: „We do anything for you, you must not disappoint us!“ In this way the children learn very early, that it necessary to avoid to be for themselves, but for someone and something else. Thus the separation from the self is transmitted, too. The consequence is indeed a performance orientation, based on a lack of self-esteem: „I don't know my true needs; therefore others have to determine, what's good for me“, and „I am loved only, if I am successful in giving high performances“. Applied to the identification problem this means, that the above mentioned consequences of the introjective identification have strong effects for the following generations, too.

What is handed-down to the next generation are predominantly the consequences of the secondary form of the identification with the aggressor, since the forms of aggression have become less severe in general, compared with the original historical process.⁶

V. The Kwangju uprising and its suppression as „late development“.

What I have said here about the consequences of the identification with the aggressor has been an ideal-typical characterization. In reality a complete extinction of selfconsciousness does not take place, neither individually nor collectively.

Though in every day life the new self alienated reality hat got an overwhelming rests of self-consciousness. Since as individuals we are not able to live with fundamental antagonisms that are constantly virulent, we assign the societally repressed side of the antagonism to a minority.

As for the rest, it's this minority, against which the machinery of control and power is mainly directed. The social distribution of the minority is unequal. Among the winners there are to be expected less dissidents than among the losers. That doesn't mean at all, that the losers so to speak would be automatically predestined dissidents. But the identification with the ruling system is fundamentally facilitated through economic success and the participation in it. The fact of unequal distribution is also true regionally. Especially the south-west provinces with the cities of

⁶ Obviously this does by no means exclude acts of severe violence towards children on the individual level, which can result in new cases of primary identification processes.

Kwangju and Chonju had a history of strong tradition of resistance. On the one hand the partisan movement lasted very long there⁷, on the other hand the region became more and more underdeveloped in the course of forced industrialization of the country under Park. This resulted system-immanently in a strong roll of the opposition party under Kim Dae-Jung. In the month of May the resistance against the seizure of power by Chun Doo-Hwan was particularly strong in Kwangju. My thesis is, that the decision by the Chun group to set a warning example just in Kwangju, by no means was accidental. The purpose was, to smash the nation-wide resistance representatively in Kwangju. From this point of view the suppression of the desire of freedom may be seen as an act of completion of the work of destruction of 1945-53.

My argument is, as mentioned, yet hypothetical. But many signs or „symptoms“ indicate, that the brutal suppression of the uprising has led to an „identification with the aggressor“, similar to that of 1945-53. Several authors have pointed to the traumatic effect of the Kwangju May.

But in the Kwangju case the identification process was much more difficult because of the lasting regional discrimination from the side of the central state, dominated by a power elite descending from other regions (Taiga etc). This can possibly explain, why there was an identification with the capitalist paradigm, while the opposition against those ruling in Seoul never disappeared. This seemingly contradictory situation may be the reason for the wide-spread estimation, that the people of Kwangju be especially „progressive“ or „independent“. The development of the debate regarding the construction of the May 18 memorial and the desecration of the original cemetery of the victims shows, that the process of identification among the people of Kwangju is turning to „normalcy“, as regionalism seems to be weakened in general. Some years ago the Movement had been very broad and strong in claiming the punishment of the persons responsible for the suppression.

It is noteworthy in my context, that the economic development expressed in regional GNP per capita-figures in Kwangju and in the Chonnam province has been clearly above the average⁸.

VI. Symptoms of an addictive society today

⁷ On the Byun-san peninsula e.g. there were groups of partisans as late as in the mid-50's.

⁸ Both what regards Kwangju for the big cities and Chonnam for the provinces stand on the first place for the period 1985-1996.

1. General symptoms

Some of the symptoms, which I interpret as symptoms of an addictive society, have been mentioned earlier. Thus the anti-communist hysteria („red complex“) has by no means disappeared; the attitude towards work (a sort of „self-sacrifice“ for the „own“ company in the production process); the other side being „management by stress“ of the companies; the attitude towards seemingly „weaker“ groups as the elderly, the handicapped, immigrant workers etc.; parents working and worrying themselves to death (or at least to suffering from poverty and disease in old age) with the desire to give their children a chance, and with the result of psychical terror upon them. By the way, these children in later years are often not able to support their old parents because of their own work addiction, their own worrying for their own children, too small apartments in crowded cities etc. The result is among others, that the family has been destroyed to a large extent as a resource for further development. But what is more: In the last instance people themselves have accomplished this by their action. And this action is a consequence of the mentioned separation from the self and the resulting auto-destruction.

2. The victim-roll

As is known from the psychoanalytical research I cited above, the victim-roll can become a lifelong pattern. In the public debates as well as in private communication the self-consciousness of being victim is very familiar. An example for this is, that it is emphasized again and again, that Korea never in its history made a war of aggression upon another nation, but that it innumerable times has been victim of aggression from outside (with this argument Korean nationalism is often justified as being absolutely undangerous, in contrast to Japan or Germany e.g.). Another example is the new roll Korea plays in the international economy, which is widely accepted in an abstract manner regarding the pride of the achieved, but not really perceived with regard to the active roll as an exploiter of foreign labor power of South Korean Chaebol. On the contrary there is still some feeling, that it is Korea, which is the victim of foreign capital. The already mentioned danger, that out of the victim-roll can emerge a justified culprit behavior, seems to be quite real in the attitude against immigrant workers, who are often seen as spongers, attracted by the material wealth the Koreans alone have achieved. Also this repeated attitude can be interpreted as a consequence of the introjective identification.

3. The Park-syndrome

A particularly striking phenomenon, which can be taken as a confirmation of my thesis seems to me the Park-syndrome of the actual political debate in South Korea. Several candidates for the presidency refer explicitly to Park Chung-Hee. The rehabilitation is remarkable broad (Shim 1997): A poll from April this year showed 76 % of those surveyed meant, that Park was South Korea's most effective president ever. Park is known as he who built the first superhighway and the steelmill of Pohang - and he was rarely accused of corruption. These characteristics become particularly essential in contrast to the actual president Kim Young-Sam, who is felt ineffective, responsible for a chain of corruption scandals and for the general impression, that South Korea's seemingly unstoppable course towards „No. 1“ has stopped. All this can be interpreted as a symptom for the delusion following the illusion on the basis of the identification with an extraneous will. Although history does not repeat itself, the actual situation seems to have something in common with that preceding the seizure of power by Park Chung-Hee in 1961.

After my mind the problem is not, whether the Korean society be „inadequately vaccinated against regression to totalitarian government“, as some oppositionals put it. This opinion itself remains within the general logic. If we look at the situation from the point of view I have proposed, I think we can suppose, that it is still the collective urge for identification, which is at the root of the Park-syndrome.

VII. Discussing the possibility of healing

The South Korean society of today appears extremely contradictory: On the one hand the boundless greed for efficiency and rationality and the unsatiability of the „ever more“, which are dominating reality; on the other hand the longing for the „enough“⁹, for emotion, which in view of the conflicting reality tends to take the form of nostalgia (a good example for this aspect seems to be the general passion for TV-“drama“).

What I have tried to describe for the South Korean society is essentially valid for all dynamic capitalist societies. The particularity of the Korean case is the extremely rapid development, made possible through the particularly deep traumatic experience. The possible ways to healing are hence similar to other modern societies. It's therefore I will use the term „we“ in discussing the following.

⁹ cf. the discussion of an empirical study based on narrative-autobiographical interviews in Hwang, K.D. 1996.

But the Korean society to a turning point, too, as have the old industrialized countries: In the same pace the „society of work“ is loosing its core medium of integration, it looses the power of it's paradigm. What will be the consequence of the „company men“ unvoluntarily returning into their family? (cf. Kim, E.Y. 1997)

What can be done in order to heal the described social pathology? If we agree, that the problem lies in the separation from the self, than healing cannot be achieved through a new „wholesom chock“. Generally speaking the way cannot be a „re-identification“ with something new. Identification of this type i.e. with something external, would only create ever new dependencies.

But we are by no means „condemned“ to remain victims. In reality there is no „psycho-mechanism“, which keeps us prisoners of our past (by the way: this thinking would lead to a self-perpetuating process). On the contrary: When we are out of the danger area the area of self-responsability begins.

As I wanted to make clear, the main consequence of the identification is societally the separation from the own collective history. Because of the overwhelming pace of social and economic development people have almost no chance to remember. But on the other side this means, that the space of time between today and their repressed history is only two generations. Thus the chance to remember is real. But this can also be a trap: In our deep longing for holeness it may be difficult to distinguish between authenticity and compensation. For example: Peasant music and drum dancing does not *per se* mean living history; and the attempt for revival of „turé“ can be a part of a modernization project, i.e. a renewed tentative to save the old paradigm instead for finding a new one, because we have internalized the capitalist paradigm of boundless feasibility. Thus in any situation of crisis we tend to increase our efforts, i.e. to deepen the crisis.

Healing can only occur from bottom up. A pre-condition for healing is opening. That makes us anxious: It is the fear for death from the original threatening situation, which comes up again. In order to learn, that we are no more victims, we need experiences on a small scale, because we must gain confidence step by step. The goal is to put solidarity in the place of competition. Every step in that direction will be a step to regain our spirituality.

VIII. Concluding remark

It seems to me absolutely important and I therefore want to repeat, that, what I have tried to describe for the South Korean society is essentially valid for all dynamic capitalist societies. Pre-condition and then reproduced consequence of capitalist development is the self-alienation of man in this society. This does not constitute any fundamental difference to other capitalist societies.

I have tried to discuss the concept of „identification with the aggressor“ as an explanation for the particularly rapid capitalist development of South Korea. The reasons I found are the depth and lastingness of the defeat of all emancipatory alternative ideas in the period 1945-53 on the one hand, and the development strategy that was successful just on the basis of this defeat, on the other hand.

That means that the preparedness of the masses for capitalist development had to be „created“ (though not necessarily „consciously“), before Park's „vision“ could get realized. It seems to me, that the time has come to take up the matter another time. In reality there is no longer any compulsion to perpetuate the introjective identification. The new generation have become „adults“, they are able to take the responsibility for their action - and they should do so.

References

- Chang, Ha-Joon** (1993): The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea. In: *Cambridge Journal of Economics*. Vol. 17. pp. 131 - 157.
- Cumings, Bruce** (1981): The Origins of the Korean War. Princeton University Press.
- Ferenczi, Sándor** (1933): Sprachverwirrung zwischen dem Erwachsenen und dem Kind. Die Sprache der Zärtlichkeit und der Leidenschaft. (Disorientated Communication Between Adult and Child. The Languages of Tenderness and of Passion). In: *Schriften zur Psychoanalyse*. Vol II.
- Ferenczi, Sándor** (1985) Ohne Sympathie keine Heilung: Das klinische Tagebuch von 1932. (There is no Healing without Sympathy. The Clinical Diary of 1932). Frankfurt am Main.
- Freud, Anna** (1936/1980): Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen. In: Die Schriften der Anna Freud. Vol. I. München.
- Gruen, Arno** (1986): Der Verrat am Selbst. Die Angst vor Autonomie bei Mann und Frau. (Betraying the Self. The Fear for Autonomy of Men and Women) München.

- Hartmann, Detlef** (1988): Die Alternative. Leben als Sabotage (The Alternative. Life as Sabotage). 2nd ed. München.
- Heide, Holger** (1997 a): Wege aus der Arbeitsgesellschaft? (Ways out of the Society of Work?) Diskussionsbeiträge zur Institutionellen und Sozialökonomie. Heft 21. University of Bremen.
- Heide, Holger** (1997 b): Soziale Implikationen der erfolgreichen Strategie der Weltmarktintegration Südkoreas (Social Implications of South Korea's Successful Integration into the World Market). Arbeitspapiere zur sozialökonomischen Ost-Asien-Forschung. Nr. 1. Universität Bremen.
- Heide, Holger** (1997 c): Nodong Undong, Chabon, Saengtaegye (Workers' Movement, Capital, and Ecology). In: *Noksaek p'yeongnon (Green Review)*. Seoul.
- Heide, Holger** (1996): China - Korea. Koreanische Direktinvestitionen in China und chinesische ArbeiterInnen in Korea (Korean Direct Investment in China and Chinese Workers in Korea). In: **Bass, Hans. H., Wohlmuth, Karl** (Hg.): China in der Weltwirtschaft. Hamburg.
- Heide, Holger** (1995): Tradierung in der Ökonomie? - Fragen nach dem Subjekt der Veränderung (Tradition in Economics? - Questions for the Subject of Change).. In: **Grenzdörffer, Klaus** (ed.): Neue Bewertungen in der Ökonomie. Pfaffenweiler.
- Heide, Holger** (1993): Chaboneui cheonryok byeonsuroeui minjok (The nation as a strategic Parameter of Capital). In: *Iron* 6/1993. Seoul.
- Henderson, G. A.** (1968): Korea. The Politics of the Vortex. Cambridge.
- Hirsch, Mathias** (1986). Zwei Arten der Identifikation mit dem Aggressor - nach Ferenczi und Anna Freud. (Two Concepts of the Identification with the Aggressor in Ferenczi and A. Freud. In: *Praxis Kinderpsychologie und Kinderpsychiatrie*. Vol. 45. pp. 198 - 205. Köln.
- Hwang, Ki-Don** (1996): Ökonomische Entwicklung und Lebenswirklichkeit von Arbeiterfamilien in Südkorea (Economic Development and the Reality of Life of Workers' Families in South Korea.) Hamburg.
- Kang, Su-Dol** (1996): Globalization of the Labor Market in South Korea. Manuscript of a Lecture hold at the International Conference on the Dynamics of Labor Migration in Asia. Tokyo.
- Kim, Eun-Young** (1997): Wandel der Intimität und Männer in der koreanischen Familie (The Change of Intimacy and Men in the Korean Family). Paper presented at the Koreanisch-Deutsche Soziologenkonferenz „Globalisierung und Kulturelle Identität“. May 26-28, 1997. Academy of Korean Studies.

- Lee, Chung H.** (1995): The Economic Transformation of South Korea. Lessons for the Transition Economies. OECD. Paris.
- Lee, Eun-Jeung** (1995): Kontinuität und Wandel in der Legitimationsstrategie der Herrschaft Park Chung-Hees (Continuity and Change in the Strategy of Legitimization of the Rule of Park Chung-Hee). In: **Saage, Richard**: Das Scheitern diktatorischer Legitimationsmuster und die Zukunftsfähigkeit der Demokratie, Festschrift für Walter Euchner
- Leftwich, Adrian** (1995): Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Development State. In: *The Journal of Developmental Studies*. Vol. 31, No. 3, Feb. 1995. London.
- Lowen, Alexander** (1989): Fear for Life. New York
- Marx, Karl** (1939): Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft). Harmondsworth.
- Palley, Howard A.** (1992): Social Policy and the Elderly in South Korea. In: *Asian Survey*. Vol. 32, No. 9, pp. 787 - 801.
- Park, Young-Bum** (1994): The Turning Point in International Migration and Economic Development in South Korea. In: *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*. Vol. 1994, pp. 1149 - 174.
- Schaef, Anne Wilson, and Fassel, Diane** (1988): The Addictive Organization. San Francisco.
- Shim, Jae-Hoon** (1997): Rose-Tinted Glasses. A troubled nation revives its former military leader. In: *Far Eastern Economic Review*. July 17. 1997.

* Aus: Proceedings of The 5th International Conference on Korean Studies. Osaka 1997.